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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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JCSM-450-63

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (C)

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft State-Defence plan transmitted by a memorandum by the Director for Arms Control, JASD (ISA), dated 5 June 1963, subject as above.

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2. The military course of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet the contingency of a spontaneous (so-called US initiated) revolt, which shows promise of succeeding,

Moreover, under existing conditions, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in JCSM-390-63, US forces should be committed incrementally in a structured "ratchet" only if some or all of the following conditions are met:

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d. Sufficient areas of Cuba are under control of the revolutionaries to justify the piecemeal implementation of CINCLANT [REDACTED]

e. An assessment is made at the time that US military participation constitutes a valid risk.




3. The draft State-Defense plan is unduly restrictive in its concept for use of airpower. It provides, during either the covert or overt phase, for US destruction of the offending names of SAM sites or air bases if the SAM battery or interceptor aircraft brought down a US plane. However, it fails to include during the overt phase of operations the need for the possible suppression and/or elimination of those air defenses which might endanger the air movement of US troops into the area.

4. The draft State-Defense plan is at variance in several significant respects with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who consider that:

a. Although a palace revolt may be the most likely type of revolt, it is unlikely to occur at this time.

b. Portions, or all of CINCLANT [REDACTED] as necessary, should be implemented to [REDACTED]



c. The possible neutralization or elimination of Soviet forces in Cuba, with either lethal or nonlethal munitions, should be included explicitly in US plans for implementation as circumstances warrant at the time.

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
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6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also do not believe that a Special Representative of the President should move immediately into Cuba to establish direct liaison between the US Government and the "provisional government." Recognition of the insurgents, including their belligerent status under the 1928 Habana Convention, should provide sufficient legal justification for US military support of the insurgents.



In any event, final US political commitment to the insurgents should be withheld until their ability to govern is demonstrated, and their political complexion evident.



7. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that many aspects of the draft State-Defense plan in its present form are not militarily feasible or desirable and, if implemented, would entail excessive risks. It is recommended that the plan be revised to reflect the comments in the foregoing paragraphs, those forwarded in JCSM-359-63, and the data forwarded by JCSM-360-63, dated 10 May 1963, to the Secretary of the Army for use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the DOD for Policy toward Cuba. A copy of JCSM-360-63, together with its attachment, is forwarded herewith.

TMH:JG 3-22 NY, p: For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Attachment

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MAXWELL D. FULMER
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